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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
UNIVERSAL DETERMINISM AND RELATIVE DETERMINATION 
Leroy N. Meyer 
Department of Philosophy 
University of South Dakota 
Vermillion, South Dakota 57069 
Recent works have shown that it is possible to devise a clear 
thesis of universal determinism. Two such theses are formulated. Ap-
parently the motivations for universal determinism have been: (I) to 
account for the explanatory power of scientific laws, (2) to support 
the principle of sufficient reason, and (3) to provide a methodological 
criterion for scientific progress. Universal determinism is, however, 
unsatisfactory in view of its apparent conflict with important physical 
theories such as quantum mechanics. The question then arises whether 
there is a weaker thesis, compatible with contemporary physical 
theories, that satisfies the motivation for universal determinism. A 
thesis of relative determination that satisfies these conditions is pro-
posed. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
The nest of philosophical views grouped under the term 
determinism has a long history extending back to pre-Socratic 
science and philosophy. In particular, theories of physical 
determinism have commanded considerable attention through-
out the history of philosophy. One sort of physical determin-
istic thesis, or other, has been a foundational part of most 
systems of explanation of physical phenomena. Physical deter-
minism arose as complementary to the materialist systems 
devised by the ancient Megarian philosopher-scientists, and it 
was perpetuated later by the Epicureans in Athens. Among 
the most explicit proponents of a thesis of physical determin-
ism were Leibniz and Laplace. 
Many contemporary philosophers would agree with 
Austin (1970:231) that in the 1950s the expression "Deter-
minism" did not name a clear philosophical view. Since the 
time of Austin's criticism, however, there has been some 
progress in the direction of clarifying precisely what is a 
deterministic system. There has been extensive clarification 
of the notions of causal explanation, event, and causal law. In 
recent years several precise statements of deterministic theses 
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have been developed. There is of course a variety of versions 
of determinism, but of primary concern here is one general 
kind of physical determinism, which may be called universal 
determinism, though remarks extend to some other kinds of 
deterministic theses as well. 
Assuming that a clear statement of a thesis of determin-
ism can be presented, the question of its fundamental interest 
must be asked. Von Wright's view is that philosophers are 
primarily interested in the logical possibility of determinism. 
Von Wright (1974:121) wrote: 
... Interest in causes and deterministic developments 
[might] be replaced by an interest in probabilistic 
developments. This change of attitude could be 
entirely satisfying to the scientist. But would neither 
solve nor eliminate the philosopher's puzzlement 
about determinism as in its logical possibility. His 
interest concerns the self-consistency of a certain 
idea with ideas concerning action and human freedom. 
Surely, philosophers are interested in this question, and it 
seems logically preliminary; but the ultimate issue regarding 
any form of determinism is whether or not there is a deter-
ministic thesis that should be believed. It shall be argued that 
the apparent basis for belief of universal determinism is un-
sound. 
It is unsatisfactory, however, simp~y to let the matter 
rest at a point at which universal determinism has no apparent 
sound basis. For, strong beliefs led to a tentative belief in uni-
versal determinism, and it might yet be hoped that a sound 
basis for some deterministic theses exists. Therefore, a modest 
alternative to universal determinism that does justice to 
sound considerations regarding causality, causal law, events, 
and scientific explanation shall be proposed. The alternative 
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framework for conceiving of causal systems is here called 
"relative determination." 
First the meaning of relative determination is explained, 
and then three deterministic theses: classical universal deter-
minism (CUD), modern universal determinism (MUD), and 
universal relative determination (URD) are distinguished. Next 
it will be important to try to understand and scrutinize the 
underlying motivation for a deterministic thesis such as CUD 
or MUD in order to determine the extent to which URD might 
serve the same purpose. There are important reasons for reject-
ing MUD as well as CUD which shall be reviewed. It shall be 
argued that such reasons for rejecting conventional universal 
deterministic theses do not apply to URD. Thus, URD can be 
viewed as a modest improvement over conventional theses 
such as MUD and CUD. Finally, the logical relation between 
MUD and URD is discussed. 
RELATNE DETERMINATION 
By "relative determination" is meant a relation that holds 
between a scientific law (or more generally, an entire theory) 
and two sets of descriptive statements. Before citing the rigor· 
ous definition of this relation, what is intended by the expres· 
sion is explained. Two non-simultaneous events are related 
to each other in accordance with some law, to the extent that 
a true, partial description of the earlier event together with the 
law are logically consistent with a description of the subse-
quent event. (Indeed, it is my view that there are no complete 
descriptions.) In the loosest sense of the term, the prior event 
description is said to determine the subsequent event descrip-
tion relative to the law. 
Since this loose sense would seem of little use, the ac-
count should be ramified to say that the prior event descrip-
tion determines the subsequent one relative to the law in 
question, provided that the conjunction of the prior event 
description and the law entail some sub-description of the 
subsequent event description, as well as be consistent with 
it. To say that a set of descriptions r of some event El deter-
mines the set of descriptions L of an event E2 relative to a 
scientific law A is to say that: (1) rand L jointly entail that 
El temporally preceded E2; (2) the conjunction of r, L, and 
A is consistent; and (3) there are disjoint and logically inde-
pendent subsets of L, say ai, and a2 such that the conjunc-
tion of r, A, and al entails some conjunction of elements 
of a2. 
As an example, the events of shooting a billiard cue ball 
northward and its subsequent hitting of an object ball lying to 
the north can be pictured. The description of hitting the cue 
ball in a northerly direction together with certain laws of me-
chanics entails that the ball not travel in a southerly direction 
before hitting some other object. Hitting the ball northward 
determines (relative to mechanics) that it will not strike a 
ball lying southward before hitting something else. If the 
description of the subsequent event includes a statement to 
the effect that the event takes place in a position that is not 
to the south of the position of the cue ball at the beginning of 
the prior event, and if all other aspects of the description of 
the subsequent event are consistent with the prior event 
description and the law, the prior event description determines 
the subsequent event description relative to the law. It is as if 
to say the law and the prior event description narrow down 
the subsequent possibilities which can be reflected in descrip_ 
tions of subsequent events. The entailment of interest in this 
example is simply that of the sub-description, "the cue ball 
passes through a spot north of its initial position at time t," 
by the conjunction of the law and a sufficient description of 
the prior event. 
An obvious objection to this use of the term "determina. 
tion" in connection with this relation is that the relatively 
determined events may in an intuitive sense be undetermined 
by the prior event. To this it must be replied simply that it is 
an arbitrary decision to use the term. There is, however, a 
further reason for using the term in this manner. It is the 
view here that determination varies in degrees, and that 
it may be the case that there is no highest degree of deter· 
mination (no complete determination). Thus, it makes sense 
to speak of even the degenerate cases of "relative determin-
ation" as cases of fairly low degree of determination in the 
pre-formal sense. Thus, it seems that the thesis of Universal 
Relative Determination, to be explained shortly in terms 
of the above definition, can be correctly viewed as a deter-
ministic thesis. 
THREE DETERMINISTIC THESES: 
CUD, MUD, AND URD 
In many respects, CUD is a paradigm of a universal deter-
ministic thesis. Its roots lie in antiquity, but its recent history 
stems from Laplace (1952: 16). In its roughest form, CUD says 
that every event is causally determined by prior events. This 
can be made more precise in the following manner: 
Given any description of an event (provided it is 
accurate) there are causal laws of the universe (in 
principle) such that the event description follows 
logically from the laws together with accurate descrip-
tions of prior events (descriptions that can in princi-
ple be given to any degree of detail). 
There are difficulties with CUD primarily stemming from the 
question of whether it is an epistemological thesis or not (i.e., 
whether or not it is to be understood as claiming that there 
are knowable laws and descriptions corresponding to every 
knowable description). 
It is unnecessary to ruminate on CUD, however, for even 
if the issues peculiar to it are cleared up there are further con-
cerns common to it and its more modern cousin, MUD, that 
can be made clear. That there is a clear statement of universal 
determinism can be appreciated by a study of parts I and II 
of the writing of Berofsky (1971). The formulation of modern 
universal determinism (MUD) here is compatible with Berof-
sky's definition (see Berofsky, 1971 :268-269). Berofsky 
developed important restrictions on descriptions and laws that 
should apply to this account as well. This account differs from 
his also in separating the notion of "deterministic system" and 
then stating the thesis in terms of that notion. By "determin-
istic system" it is meant that: 
A collection of (possibly) interacting bodies forms a 
deterministic system under a set of causal laws if at 
any given moment any assertion that truly describes 
subsequent states of the system is deducible from the 
causal laws together with some true description of 
the state of the system at the given moment in ques-
tion. 
The thesis of MUD is then: 
The Universe is a deterministic system of its particles 
under the set of the laws of nature. 
Although the broadest deterministic thesis possible is ex-
hibited, it is possible to present theses corresponding to 
portions of modern science (such as "sub-atomic particles 
constitute a deterministic system under the yet undiscovered 
laws of physics"). Such corollary theses are subject to the 
discussion that follows regarding MUD. 
In order to state an alternative to MUD, the definition of 
relative determination must be recalled: 
A prior event description determines a subsequent 
one relative to a law in question, provided that the 
conjunction of the prior event description and the 
law entail some sub-description of the subsequent 
event description, as well as be consistent with it. 
The thesis of universal relative determination is: 
Every true event description implies an event descrip-
tion that is determined in the appropriate sense by 
some other true event description relative to some 
law (not necessarily causal). 
More precisely URD says: 
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For every true description of an event E1, there is a 
true description of another event E2 and a scientific 
law A such that E2 determines E1 relative to A. 
URD AND THE MOTIY A nON FOR MUD 
Any motivation for putting forth MUD is closely tied to 
the question of its rejection. Just what criteria are relevant 
for rejection of MUD depend upon what questions are sup-
posedly answered by it. There seem to be three motivations 
for MUD: (1) the desire for an account of the explanatory 
power of the entire body of scientific laws, both known and 
yet unknown; (2) an interest in supporting the principle of 
sufficient reason; and (3) the need for a methodological cri-
terion for relative progress of scientific theories. 
It might seem clear that MUD is a meta theoretic state-
ment regarding scientific explanations insofar as it makes 
reference to scientific laws. It appears to be a generalization 
about the explanatory power of all causal laws collectively 
(whether discovered or not). In that case MUD addresses the 
question: "What are the explanatory limits of scientific laws 
as a whole?" The motivation would then be to provide a 
holistic basis for the explanatory power of scientific laws. 
Thus, MUD says that any phenomenon describable in principle, 
is in principle explainable. 
A similar, but rather unclear motivation for MUD would 
be to support the principle of sufficient reason. Despite La-
place's (1952) apparent argument to the converse, the princi-
ple of sufficient reason (if such a thing can be clearly stated) 
should be implied by CUD. Thus, MUD should imply the 
principle of sufficient reason. 
A quite different motivation for MUD is to provide a 
methodological standard for scientific explanation. This is 
different from the first motivation in an important respect. 
The earlier concern was for the logical possibility of causal 
explanation; whereas now demands that should be placed on a 
scientific explanation are of concern. According to MUD then, 
mature science should be expected to provide theoretic models 
of deterministic systems under causal laws in explanation of 
describable phenomena. Theories that do not achieve this goal 
are relatively immature according to MUD. 
To account for scientific explanation seems a respectable 
hope, though perhaps unrealistic. MUD attempts to address 
the question as to the limits of scientific laws by saying that 
in fact causal laws are unlimited. In light of modern physics, 
MUD has been challenged on this very issue, which shall be 
addressed when the rejection of MUD is considered. On the 
other hand, support of the principle of sufficient reason ap-
pears more difficult to appreciate as a reason for trying to 
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defend MUD, principally because of its own obscurity. The 
most worthy motivation for MUD is (3), need for a criterion 
of scientific progress. 
There surely is an important role for a criterion (or cri-
teria, for that matter) to judge scientific theories as to their 
relative progress in explanation. MUD suggests that progress 
is made by developing more extensive deterministic system 
models. Thus, a theory that provides a more complete deter-
ministic system is to be preferred. This may be a misleading 
criterion as later consideration will tend to show. For, it would 
lead to the choice of a causal hypothesis over a statistical 
hypothesis even where the statistical one is more far reaching 
and unifies more theories. 
It is not difficult to appreciate that URD tends to satisfy 
the need for a criterion of progress in science. Since URD 
provides that there are relative deterministic explanations (in 
the form of laws and descriptions of prior events) for any 
desirable phenomena, on the basis of URD an explanatory 
theory and observational research should be expected to yield 
such descriptions and laws. A quite natural way to judge rela-
tive progress, on the basis of URD, would be in terms of an 
increase in relative determination. 
Concerning motivation (1) to account for scientific ex-
planation, URD does not provide a precise answer, for it is 
very modest compared to MUD. It does, however, entail at 
least that it is always possible in principle to provide some 
relative-deterministic explanation for any given describable 
phenomena. Thus, URD tells something about limits of 
scientific explanation. It tells that there are not epistemolog-
ically discrete event descriptions in the sense that in principle 
every event description that is true can be related to some 
other event description in accordance with a law. 
Even motivation (2), the interest in the principle of suf-
ficient reason, might be seen as satisfied by URD, depending 
upon what the principle of sufficient reason is taken to be. But 
this point is not pressed, for little coherent substance to the 
alleged principle is to be found. 
URDAND 
THE REJECTION OF MUD 
Perhaps most contemporary philosophers do not accept 
MUD. But the reasons for its rejection are quite diverse, and 
there apparently is little consensus among those who have an 
educated opinion. The most prominent conditions for rejec-
tion of MUD are: 
(1) falsification of MUD (as some libertarians seem 
to argue, regarding CUD); 
(2) incoherence of MUD, as Austin (1970:231) ar-
gued; 
(3) incompatibility of MUD with other important 
beliefs (such as free will, or a particular under-
standing of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle); 
and to this list one condition should be added: 
(4) implausibility of MUD. 
Some contemporary philosophers seem to hold that 
condition (1) is satisfied, that MUD is falsified by quantum 
mechanics and molecular theory of gases. Berofsky (1971: 
287-288) pointed out, however, that a theory of statistical 
laws is not necessarily indeterministic. Still there are argu-
ments, to which Berofsky alluded, to the effect that quantum 
mechanics is essentially indeterministic. (More of this point 
is discussed below.) The view that freedom of the Will con-
flicts with MUD, and that freedom is undeniably experienced 
satisfies the condition of falsification. But none of these views 
seems as yet articulated clearly enough to falsify MUD con-
clusively. 
The condition of incoherence seems unsatisfied by MUD 
or by Berofsky's (1971:285) definition of determinism. Even 
if MUD is unclear in certain respects, it can be clarified along 
the lines of Berofsky's account. Von Wright (1974:99-106) 
offered still another coherent statement of universal deter-
minism. (I differ with Von Wright in stating deterministic 
theses in terms of event descriptions, rather than systems state 
changes. My account is more in keeping with Berofsky's.) 
On the other hand MUD does seem to conflict with quan-
tum mechanics in a serious way. [Von Wright (1974) alluded 
to this point in the earlier quote.] Roughly put, the problem 
is that as a logical consequence of quantum mechanics if a 
particle can be precisely located, then the particle's energy 
will be indeterminate. According to Hanson (1967), Heisen-
berg's uncertainty prinCiple is the generalization of this limita-
tion. Some have objected to the claim that the uncertainty 
principle be regarded as being incompatible with determinism, 
on the grounds that Heisenberg's principle is merely an epis-
temological limitation that is incompatible only with deter-
ministic theses which are essentially epistemological. (Notice 
that whether quantum mechanics is true, as would be impor-
tant with respect to the condition of falsification, is not now 
considered.) It must be realized that according to the uncer-
tainty principle it is impossible in principle to determine both 
the energy and the location of a particle at a given time. 
What might be basis for supposing then that both properties 
are in fact precisely determined by prior states of the Uni-
verse? 
These latest remarks, however, are insufficient to show 
that the third condition of incompatibility with other beliefs is 
satisfied by MUD with respect to quantum mechanics. On the 
other hand, they are appropriate in showing that MUD is im-
plaUSible which is just condition (4). As a characterization of 
scientific explanation, MUD is implausible in light of actual 
scientific explanations. 
Two of the motivations for MUD should be recalled: (1) 
the desire for an account of explanatory power of scientific 
laws and (3) the need for a methodological criterion for rela-
tive progress of scientific theories. On the basis of the uncer-
tainty principle, it is implausible to make such a claim as MUD 
which makes an unwarranted generalization about the explan-
atory power of causal laws. It is doubtful that causal laws, 
even collectively, have the power MUD claims for them in the 
light of modern physics. 
Concerning its service in satisfying the motive that there 
is need for a criterion of progress, MUD seems misleading as a 
criterion for scientific progress. It seems extremely implausi-
ble to regard quantum mechanics as immature compared to 
causal explanations of the same phenomena it addresses solely 
on grounds of MUD. As Hanson (1967:45) pointed out, 
quantum mechanics has more explanatory power than rival 
accounts insofar as it uniquely covers diverse phenomena. It 
seems more plausible to regard MUD as representative of a 
relatively immature concept of explanation in view of modern 
physics. Defense of MUD on grounds that modern physics may 
be retrogressive seems an even less plausible line. 
As a result of these considerations there is reason to reject 
MUD. Surely, it seems not to fulfill its intended function in a 
reasonable way. On the other hand, URD would seem to sur-
vive each of the conditions for rejection entertained here. 
URD is certainly too weak to be falsified by an experience of 
freedom even if MUD can be falsified. In fact, URD seems very 
unlikely to conflict with important and relevant beliefs so that 
it survives the condition of incompatibility with other impor-
tant theories, as well as the condition of falsification. It surely 
does not conflict with quantum mechanics. URD does not 
require that every feature of an event be entailed by some law 
and prior event descriptions, and it does not specify that the 
relevant laws be causal. 
As for the plausibility of URD, earlier remarks regarding 
motivations might be recalled. URD would not lead to expec-
tation of a causal explanation instead of a statistical one, when 
a causal one should not be expected in the context of con-
temporary physics. According to URD there are no discrete 
event descriptions. True event descriptions can always be 
related to others in accordance with some law. Thus, in the 
sense of relative determination, every describable phenom-
enon is explanable. This is more plausible than MUD insofar 
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as the history of science seems to disallow this without ex-
ception, whereas science does not nullify MUD unexception-
ally. 
CONCLUSION 
Universal relative determination satisfies the most impor-
tant motivations for espousing modern universal determinism, 
and in that sense URD can be viewed as an alternative to 
MUD. Furthermore, there are strong grounds for rejecting 
MUD and no similar grounds against URD. On the basis of 
these two points, it should be concluded that there is a philo-
sophical justification for replacing MUD with URD. 
There are, however, serious limitations to the importance 
of URD as implicitly admitted throughout this paper. URD is 
a very modest claim compared with MUD. They are compati-
ble with each other. Indeed MUD implied URD. But, because 
of URD's greater generality than MUD, it is a weaker claim 
than MUD. Consequently, although it tends towards satisfy-
ing the motivations for an expression of the limits of scientific 
explanation and for a methodological criterion for scientific 
progress, URD does not satisfy these motivations completely, 
in the manner in which MUD might be thought to do, if it 
were acceptable. Much more should be said as to the limits 
of explanation and in regard for standards for determining 
relative scientific progress. 
In its modest way URD performs a philosophical function: 
it articulates a logical relation that holds between phenomenal 
descriptions and laws of science, and asserts that we should 
expect such a relation to obtain. That URD does not, and 
cannot, perform the strong philosophical function that La-
place (1952) intended for CUD, and more recent determinists 
intended for MUD, ought not to be disappointing. For both 
MUD and CUD tend to stultify contemporary conceptions of 
scientific explanation and scientific progress rather than com-
plementing those conceptions; whereas, URD does comple-
ment notions of explanation and progress. Reason advises 
that the implausible principle, MUD, be ignored in favor of 
the more modest, but plausible, URD with full intentions of 
continuing careful reflections on the conceptual framework 
of explanation of natural phenomena. 
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